Received view of theories
The received view of theories is a position in the philosophy of science that identifies a scientific theory with a set of propositions which are considered to be linguistic objects, such as axioms. Frederick Suppe describes the position of the received view by saying that it identifies scientific theories with "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms are given a partial observation interpretation by mean of correspondence rules."[1] The received view is generally associated with the logical empiricists.
Recently, the received view of theories has been displaced by the semantic view of theories as the dominant position in theory formulation in the philosophy of science.[2][3][4]
Notes
- ^ Suppe, Frederick (1989). The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. p. 38.
- ^ Suppe, Frederick (1998). "Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998" (PDF). Philosophy of Science. 67: S102–S115. doi:10.1086/392812. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
- ^ Halvorson, Hans (2012). "What Scientific Theories Could Not Be" (PDF). Philosophy of Science. 79 (2): 183–206. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.692.8455. doi:10.1086/664745. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
- ^ Frigg, Roman (2006). "Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories" (PDF). Theoria. 55 (2). The University of Chicago Press: 183–206. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
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Precursors |
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- Auguste Comte
- Henri Poincaré
- Pierre Duhem
- Rudolf Steiner
- Karl Pearson
- Charles Sanders Peirce
- Wilhelm Windelband
- Alfred North Whitehead
- Bertrand Russell
- Otto Neurath
- C. D. Broad
- Michael Polanyi
- Hans Reichenbach
- Rudolf Carnap
- Karl Popper
- Carl Gustav Hempel
- W. V. O. Quine
- Thomas Kuhn
- Imre Lakatos
- Paul Feyerabend
- Ian Hacking
- Bas van Fraassen
- Larry Laudan
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